Response to Statement of Appellate Issues.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This matter arises as a result of the decision rendered by the Village of Corrales Village Council
(governing body) on September 16, 2021 to deny the DeHoffs’ preferred application for a building
permit. Appellants contend that the governing body acted fraudulently, arbitrarily,
capriciously, and otherwise not in accordance with law when they upheld the decision
of the Planning Administrator, Laurie Stout, to deny the building permit which did not comply with
the Village Zoning Code. Appellants argue that Ordinance 21-04, an ordinance updating the
definition of “dwelling unit,” is invalid and thus unenforceable due to an alleged failure to
include an enacting
clause or mayoral endorsement, an alleged failure to provide public notice, and an alleged conflict
with the Village’s Comprehensive Plan. Next, Appellants state that the governing body’s decision
was not supported by substantial evidence because “all of [Appellants’] plan submissions meet the
language and intent of the Dwelling Unit Definition.” Appellants also contend that the Planning
Administrator’s application of the updated definition was an ultra vires act.
Additionally, Appellants allege a due process violation, asserting no notice of the right to appeal
was provided at any step in the Permitting process, and that “none of the Denial letters ever
established any right for us to appeal [Laurie’s] decisions[.]” [Statement of Issues (SOI), 8].
Finally, Appellants allege an equal protections violation, stating that another similarly situated
house plan was approved while theirs had been denied.
II. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On June 15, 2021, the Village of Corrales adopted Ordinance 21-04, which updated the Village Code
Sections 18-29 and 18-203, the definitional sections of the Land Use Code, Chapter 18 [RP 69-71].
On July 15, 2021, Kenneth and Kathleen DeHoff (Appellants) submitted a construction permit
application to then-building official, Joseph Benney [RP 2-3].
On July 19, 2021, Mr. DeHoff submitted building plans to the Planning Department which depicted a
casita on the opposite side of the garage from the primary structure [RP 17]. The casita, according
to the labels provided by Mr. DeHoff, contained a kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom.
The Planning Administrator notified Appellants by phone that the plans as submitted did not conform
with the Village Code, as the plans violated Section 18-33(2)(a) in having more than one “dwelling
unit” per lot [RP 19].
2
Appellants e-mailed the Mayor, again submitting a drawing that depicted a home with two dwelling
units joined by a common wall (the garage). Mr. DeHoff, in his e-mail, alludes that the drawing
does not run afoul of the “one dwelling unit per lot” requirement because the casita does not have
an oven or range [RP 19-20].
On July 20, 2021, Mr. Benney and the Planning Administrator approved the building permit
application pursuant to the modified floor plans submitted by Appellants because the prior casita
was attached to the dwelling unit with a common heated hallway [RP 1, RP 22]. On July 21, 2021,
the Planning Administrator reached out to Appellants to request clarification regarding
which floor plan submitted by Mr. DeHoff was to be considered. Her concern arose from the conflict
between the approved plans [RP 22] and the testimony in the July 20, 2021 Council Meeting given by
Mrs. DeHoff on the night of the 20th whereby she stated there would be a “kitchen in the casita”
and a bedroom for a guest to stay, neither of
which were reflected in the approved floor plan on the afternoon of the 20th [RP 24-25].
On September 3, 2021, the Village Administrator contacted Appellants and offered to discuss
options with Appellants regarding the building permit approval to find other acceptable
alternatives to the approved building plans [RP 72].
On August 8, 2021, the DeHoffs appealed the building permit application denial of the plan that
created two dwelling units joined by a common wall. On September 16, Appellants had a hearing
before the Village Council to appeal the “denied” building permit applications, seeking Council
action to invalidate its own Village Code [RP 49-64; Sept 16 Special Council Meeting].
The approved building permit was not appealed. The Planning Administrator
explained that the original drawing as submitted on July 15 was denied because
3
the casita “touched the garage, it was not a part of the house. You couldn’t go into the primary
entrance of the house and get to that area.” [TR 17:10-17:16].
The Village Council affirmed the Planning Administrator’s denial of the original plan
submitted on July 15 and issued their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 12, 2021,
reasserting that the original plan as submitted constituted two dwelling units pursuant to the
definitions set forth in Ordinance 21-04, which thereby violated §18-33(2)(a) and the modified
plans ameliorated that concern [RP 81-83].
On October 19, 2021, Appellants filed the instant appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
Appellants pro se have made several legal arguments that properly fit under the Rule 1-074 standard
of review of whether a decision was according to law. The Village therefore sets forth the legal
rules applicable to their arguments first, then addresses the substance of those arguments below.
A. Standard of Review
1. Review of the Administrative Decision.
Administrative decisions are reviewed under an administrative standard of review which limits
reviewing courts to determining whether the administrative agency acted fraudulently,
arbitrarily or capriciously, whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, or
whether the agency acted in accordance with the law. Paule v. Santa Fe County Bd. of County Com'rs,
2005-NMSC-021, 138 N.M. 82, 117 P.3d 240. As such, the party seeking to overturn an administrative
entity's decision must establish that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the
decision. Gallup Westside Development, LLC v. City of Gallup, 2004-NMCA-010, 135 N.M. 30, 84 P.3d
78. "The determination of whether a decision is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable is not a
question separate and apart from whether the decision is supported by
4
substantial evidence." Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 1975-NMCA-057 ⁋ 2, 88
N.M. 10, 536 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1975). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion.” Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-
NMSC-114, ¶ 7, 111 N.M. 137. “Evidence is substantial even if it barely tips the scales in favor
of the party bearing the burden of proof.” Id. “The question is not whether substantial evidence
exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result
reached.” Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329.
Reviewing courts “resolve[ ] all disputes of [the] facts in favor of the successful party and
indulge[
] all reasonable inferences in support of the prevailing party.” Id. Further, reviewing courts
“will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder.” Id.
See also Rule 1-074 NMRA 20201 and NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-1.1(D), stating that
[i]n a proceeding for judicial review of a final decision by an agency, the district court may set
aside, reverse or remand the final decision if it determines that:
(1) the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously;
(2) the final decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or
(3) the agency did not act in accordance with law.
Accordingly, a reviewing court will affirm an administrative decision that is supported by
substantial evidence, is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, and is otherwise according to
law.
2. Review for the Validity of Ordinances.
Generally, “the law presumes that public officials perform their duties until the contrary is
shown.” City of Alamogordo v. McGee, 1958-NMSC-078, 64 N.M. 253, ¶ 15, quoting Herrera v. Zia Land
Co., 51 N.M. 390, 185 P.2d 975. Moreover, “[t]he application of the presumptions of regularity and
validity of the acts of officers of a municipal corporation has been uniform and is to be found in
a multitude of decisions on almost every point presented by the ramification of the law relating
to them.” Id., ¶ 16, citing McQuillan on Corporations (Rev. Ed.), 633. “There is a
5
presumption that a municipal ordinance is valid; and that presumption stands until it is clearly
established that such ordinance is invalid.” Id. at 17. “It is fundamental that an ordinance as
well as a statute is presumed to be valid and that one who attacks it has the burden of coming
forward with evidence of its invalidity.” City of Lovington v. Hall, 1961-NMSC-021, ⁋ 4, 68 N.M.
143, 359 P.2d 769 (S. Ct. 1961). Case law supports that public officials need only
demonstrate substantial compliance with statutory procedures. See Hawthorne v. City of Santa Fe, 88
N.M. 123, 537 P.2d 1385 (1975), Miles v. Bd. of County Com'rs of County of Sandoval, 1998-NMCA-
118, 125 N.M. 608, 964 P.2d 169, and City of Alamogordo v. McGee. Particularly, if
“[t]he purpose of the statute has been met…that is all that is required” in order to demonstrate
substantial compliance. Hawthorne at 8.
3. Review regarding Ultra Vires actions.
The definition of ultra vires is set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[u]nauthorized; beyond the
scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” (11th ed. 2019). As retold in
New Mexico case law in the context of planning and zoning, “[a] decision of a zoning body which is
not within the authority granted and does not reasonably relate to the objectives of zoning is
ultra vires and unenforceable.” Bogan v. Sandoval County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 1994-NMCA-157, ¶
18, 119 N.M. 334, 340, 890 P.2d 395, 401. “[I]mproper performance of an activity authorized by law
is, despite its impropriety, still ‘authorized’ within the meaning of the
... governmental function test. An agency's violation of a regulatory statute that requires the
agency to perform an activity in a certain way cannot render the activity ultra vires, as such a
conclusion would swallow the ... rule by merging the concepts of negligence and ultra vires.”
VanderVossen v. City of Espanola, 2001-NMCA-016, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 287, 293, 24 P.3d 319, 325.
“Therefore, mere negligence or mistake resulting in a violation of regulatory ordinance…does not
make [the agency’s] decision an ultra vires act.” Id. Thus, one must evaluate whether the action
in question
6
is within the scope of the power granted to the Planning Administrator, and later the Planning and
Zoning Commission in ratification of the action taken in order to determine its correctness in the
face of statutory authority and those powers granted by Village ordinance.
4. Due Process
“The first step in a procedural due process claim is to identify the state-created substantive
right at stake and determine whether this right triggers procedural due process protections, while
the second step is to determine how much process is due to avoid an erroneous deprivation[.]”
Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, ⁋ 18, 140 N.M. 136, 140 P.3d 1085. “Generally, due process
requires notice and some kind of hearing prior to the state acting to deprive a person of a
protected interest.” Id. citing Yount v. Millington, 117 N.M. 95 at 101, 869 P.2d 283 at 289. More
specifically, “[b]y ‘procedural due process’ [the Court] mean[s] the … element of the due process
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which relates to the requisite characteristics of
proceedings seeking to effect a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Reid v. New Mexico Bd.
of Examiners of Optometry, 1979-NMSC-005, ¶ 6, 92 N.M. 414, 415–16, 589 P.2d 198, 199–
200. Procedural due process “may be described as follows: one whom it is sought to deprive of such
rights must be informed of this fact (that is, he must be given notice of the proceedings against
him); he must be given an opportunity to defend himself (that is, a hearing); And the proceedings
looking toward the deprivation must be essentially fair.” Id. “In other words, a state cannot
deprive any individual of personal or property rights except after a hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal.” Id. Thus, the appropriate standard of review is first whether there is a
state-created substantive right at stake, and if so, whether such a right triggers procedural due
process protection. If such a protected right exists, then one must evaluate whether the facts
support or refute the claim that such protections were not provided – that is, whether the
individual denied was provided notice
7
of the denial, an opportunity to attend a hearing, and whether the proceedings were “essentially
fair.”
5. Equal Protection
To establish an equal protection claim for a class of one a plaintiff must show that he was treated
differently from others who were similarly situated without a rational basis for the
difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Here Appellants argue that they were treated differently than another homeowner who allegedly had
a separate dwelling unit. Nevertheless, Appellants fail to show that they were similarly
situated, where the other building permit application made no mention of a kitchen and would not
have been considered a separate dwelling unit under the new definition enacted in the Village
Zoning Code. The differences in Appellants’ application and the one they cite show that they were
not similarly situated and that there was a rational basis for treating them differently [RP 48,
57].
B. The Village’s Decision was supported by substantial evidence in the form of Mrs.
DeHoff’s testimony that the casita contained a kitchen, making it a second dwelling unit on the
property, which was prohibited by the Village Code.
Appellants contend that the Planning Administrator acted in a fashion that violated each of the
provisions set forth in Rule 74; Appellants raise each issue independently. However, the standard
as to whether a decision rendered by an agency is arbitrary or capricious, while iterated above, is
repeated in relevant part here, “[t]he determination of whether a decision is arbitrary, capricious
and unreasonable is not a question separate and apart from whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence.” Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. Reviewing
courts “resolve[ ] all disputes of [the] facts in favor of the successful party and
indulge[ ] all reasonable inferences in support of the prevailing party.” Las Cruces Prof'l Fire
Fighters v. City of Las Cruces. Additionally, reviewing courts “will not reweigh the evidence nor
substitute our
8
judgment for that of the fact[-]finder.” Id. Therefore, we must address Appellants’
arguments pertaining to Rule 74 review as a whole
Appellants claim that Ordinance 21-04 “cannot apply to our circumstance” [TR 31:19- 31:33] and
that applying “Section 18[-33 of the Corrales Village Code] was arbitrary and
capricious…the casita with a casita kitchen with no appliances which was consistent with the prior
Section 18” [TR 32:02-32:33]. Curiously, Appellants simultaneously argue that their original plan
was “in compliance with the Dwelling Unit Definition” and “compliance with the actual
language of the Dwelling Unit Definition is not refuted.” [SOI 5]. Appellants mistakenly assert
that they are in compliance with the updated definitions set forth by Ordinance 21-04,
while ignoring the plain language of the definitions. Moreover, Appellants seem to conflate
compliance with the superseded ordinance as compliance with the existing, enforceable Zoning Code.
The definition at issue is as follows:
Dwelling Unit means a single unit with connected rooms intended, or designed to be built, used,
rented, leased, let or hired out to be occupied, providing complete independent living
facilities for one or more persons, including permanent provisions for each and every
one of the following uses: living, sleeping, eating, cooking and sanitation. A dwelling
unit may be a mobile home, modular home, manufactured home or site-built house. It may also be
an independent unit of an apartment, townhouse or other such multiple-unit residential
structure, where allowed by Zoning Code. Recreational vehicles, travel trailers or converted
buses, whether on wheels or a permanent foundation cannot be a dwelling unit.
§18-29. Relevant to the discussion at hand is the second definition amended by Ordinance 21-04,
where “[k]itchen means any room used, intended or designed to be used for cooking or
the preparation of food.” Appellants arrive at the conclusion that the casita identified in the
original plan is not a “dwelling unit” because the kitchen has no appliances. The presence of
appliances, however, does not dictate whether a kitchen is considered a kitchen under
the Village Code. Moreover, they seem to fixate unnecessarily on the Planning Administrator’s
attempt to clarify the
9
area of non-compliance in the original plans. The Planning Administrator correctly identified –
based on Appellants’ own plans and labels and the DeHoffs’ own testimony that the casita would
contain a kitchen – the necessary elements of a second dwelling unit: a bedroom (for living and
sleeping), bathroom (for sanitation), kitchen (for eating or cooking), and a large unidentified
area (for additional living space). Appellants mistakenly believe that “connected rooms” was
intended to mean “sharing a wall.” But as the Planning Administrator testified during the
September 16 hearing, such a literal application leads to absurd results. “A duplex, a triplex,
and a fourplex ‘are connected’” and would thus be permitted [TR 8:22-8:30]. However “the Village
still has ‘one dwelling unit per lot’ as a staple in our comprehensive plan and our ordinances in
all zones.” [TR 8:34-8:40], referring to §18-33(2)(a), §18-34(2)(a), §18-35(2)(a), and §18-37(3)(a)
of the Village Code. Applying the plain meaning of the “dwelling unit” definition to all proposed
building permit applications would lead to a direct conflict with the Village Comprehensive Plan
and Village Code. Accordingly, the Planning Administrator interpreted the meaning of “connected
rooms” as the Council intended in enacting the definitional update with Ordinance 21-04. This
interpretation gave rise to what Appellants call “Laurie’s Connected Interpretation” [SOI
4]. “Where an ordinance is ambiguous, however, courts must look beyond the plain language.”
Lantz v. Santa Fe Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 2004-NMCA-090, ⁋ 7, 136 N.M. 74, 94 P.3d 817,
citing TBCH, Inc.
v. City of Albuquerque, 117 N.M. 569, 572, 874 P.2d 30, 33. “Because this is an administrative
appeal, the second applicable rule is that we ‘give persuasive weight to
long-standing administrative constructions of statutes by the agency charged with administering
them.’” Lantz,
⁋ 7, quoting High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, 126 N.M. 413,
970 P.2d 599. “There are numerous decisions, in zoning and other areas of law, that do not include
a long-standing requirement, but still allow a reviewing court to give some deference to
10
an agency's interpretation of its own ordinance.” Alba v. Peoples Energy Resources Corp., 2004-
NMCA-084, ⁋ 22, 136 N.M. 79, 94 P.3d 822. And “[t]hird, to the extent that multiple sections of
the ordinance come into play, we consider the relevant sections together ‘so that all parts are
given effect.’” Lantz, ⁋ 7, citing High Ridge Hinkle, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5. That is to say, the
Planning Administrator has deference to apply the definition of “dwelling unit” as
closely to the plain language of the definition without running afoul of the Village Code,
thereby creating a uniform interpretation of “connected” rooms. The Planning Administrator,
moreover, provided to the Appellants this interpretation in writing on July 21 along with a
detailed explanation regarding the nature of how the casita was not appropriately connected. The
Planning Administrator continued to apply this interpretation to each version of the building
permit plans submitted by Appellants [RP 24-25].
The record reflects that the Planning Administrator’s action in denying the original
building permit application with the casita, kitchen, and bedroom was not arbitrary or capricious,
and was supported by the Village Code. Appellants take issue with the denial of the “second
drawing” submitted, stating that the permit application “with office and workshop” labels was
denied with “only the text of Ordinance 21-04 as the justification for this Denial.”
[SOI 3]. Appellants go on to state that “her explanation letter after this assertion concerns our
comments at the July 20 Appellee Council Meeting after the second denial and are
irrelevant” [SOI 4]. Appellants, however, ignore the fact that the comments at the July 20
meeting were commentary from Mrs. DeHoff, testifying that the area in question was still
a “casita” with a “kitchen” as identified by Mrs. DeHoff, and a bedroom [RP 73-74],
which conflicted with the “office and workshop” plans submitted and preliminarily approved by
the Building Official, Mr. Benney. [RP 1; SOI 3]. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
denial of the initial application.
11
C. The Planning Administrator’s Interpretation of the Ordinance was Appropriate and Denial of the
Initial Application was in Accordance with Law.
The Record reflects that Ordinance 21-04 was passed June 15, 2021 and was in effect at the time of
the original permit application [RP 3, dated 7/15/2021; RP 69-70]. Moreover, there is testimony
from the Planning Administrator explaining that “one dwelling unit per lot” is a
characteristic of the Village embedded in the Code and Comprehensive Plan [TR
8:34-8:40]. Appellants themselves provide the letter from the Planning Administrator requesting
clarification for which plan they are proposing to build, as well as explaining the defect in the
original plan as it pertains to the Village Code [RP 24-25]. Appellants claim “The
village code provides no mechanism to reject a ‘Casita or Apartment or duplex’” while
simultaneously demonstrating an understanding of the Village Code’s restriction on multiple
dwelling units per lot (pursuant to §18- 33(2)(a) and others) by stating “[m]y casita/workshop area
is not a dwelling unit because it is not a single unit[.]” [RP 13, 15]. There is ample evidence
throughout the Record that Appellants were made aware of the defect in the original
building permit application, and that both Planning Administrator and Village Administrator
attempted to work with Appellants to get an acceptable building permit approved, and in fact such a
single dwelling unit plan was submitted and approved [RP 72-74]. The Village Council heard the
Appellants’ appeal of the original building permit application denial on September 16 and upheld
the Planning Administrator’s decision to deny the permit based on the evidence presented at
the hearing [RP 81-83]. Appellants have failed to demonstrate a lack of substantial
evidence in the record to support the conclusion reached by either the Planning Administrator or
the Village Council in upholding the denial of the original permit submission. An agency is
entitled to “a reasonable interpretation of its own ordinance.” Filippi
v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Torrance Cty., 2018-NMCA-050, ⁋ 21, 424 P.3d 658. The Planning
Administrator therefore reasonably interpreted and applied the updated definition of “dwelling
12
unit” pursuant to Ordinance 21-04 to Appellants’ building permit application, and that there is
substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion.
D. Ordinance 21-04 was a Validly Enacted Ordinance and Complied with the Notice
Requirements of Due Process.
Appellants assert next that Ordinance 21-04 was an invalid, unenforceable ordinance
because “[t]he mayor never endorsed the Ordinance;” “[t]here is no enacting clause in
the Ordinance;” that it “is in direct conflict with the Corrales Village Comprehensive Plan” and
that “[a]ppellees violated NM §3-17-3(A) in failing to state the subject matter…in the Albuquerque
Journal notice of hearing[.]” [SOI 4].
The record, however, refutes these alleged defects. Specifically, page 71 contains the Mayoral
endorsement and Clerk’s certification of Ordinance 21-04; the Ordinance also contains the enacting
language, “PASSED, APPROVED, AND ADOPTED by the Governing Body of the Village of Corrales, New
Mexico, this 15th day of June, 2021.” [RP 70]. The language of the Public Notice for the
adoption of Ordinance 21-04 states “A general summary of the subject matter of the Ordinance is
contained in its title” which reads that the purpose is to “AMEND THE DEFINITIONS OF
ACCESSORY STRUCTURES, ACCESSORY USE, KITCHEN, AND
DWELLING UNIT.” [RP 79]. This summary is precisely what Ordinance 21-04 accomplished, rather than
Appellants’ assertion that it was “a new policy of outlawing accessory dwelling
units[.]” [SOI 4].
Moreover, as the Planning Administrator testified in the September 16 appeal hearing, the Village
has a long history of promoting a one dwelling unit per lot [TR 8:30-8:41]. The
Comprehensive Plan, adopted in 2006, supports this testimony. Policy 2.3.1 iterates
that the “Village should require the residential dwelling unit density to be one-acre net and
two-acre net to preserve the lifestyle, character, and environment of Corrales.” [Village
Comprehensive Plan,
13
page 25]. Consequently, Ordinance 21-04, as a factual matter, cannot be “in direct conflict with
the Corrales Village Comprehensive Plan” nor a violation of §3-21-5(A). “There is a presumption
that a municipal ordinance is valid; and that presumption stands until it is clearly established
that such ordinance is invalid.” City of Alamogordo v. McGee, ⁋ 17. This presumption of validity
is entwined with the doctrine of substantial compliance. “Substantial compliance is a doctrine of
statutory interpretation that examines whether an actor follows a statute sufficiently so as to
carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted and in a manner that accomplishes the
reasonable objectives of the statute.” Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2010-NMCA-108, ⁋ 17, 149 N.M.
92, 244 P.3d 787 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, even if Appellants were
correct that some part of the process had been missed, the presumption is in the favor of the
Ordinance’s validity, and it is the Appellants’ burden to demonstrate a lack thereof. They have
not met this burden and in fact Appellants received all process as required by law.
Appellees respectfully direct the Court to §3-17-3(A), which provides that “[n]otice by publication
of the title and subject matter of any ordinance proposed for adoption by the governing body of
any municipality must take place at least two weeks prior to consideration of final
action[.]” Subsection B states that notice “shall be published one time as a legal advertisement in
a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality.” Lastly, Subsection C dictates that
“[c]opies of a proposed ordinance shall be available to interested persons during normal and
regular business hours of the municipal clerk upon request and payment of a reasonable charge
beginning with the date of publication and continuing to the date of consideration[.]” Evidence of
not only substantial compliance, but strict compliance, exists in the actual publication on May 31,
2021 [RP 79].
14
E. The Decision of the Planning Administrator was Within the Scope of her Duties as Planning
Administrator and was therefore not Ultra Vires.
The Planning Administrator has deference, as mentioned above, to reasonably interpret an otherwise
ambiguous Ordinance. Appellants state that “her assessment that we are building two dwelling
units is false” [SOI 8]. The record demonstrates the defect in the original building plan
submitted to the Planning Department, particularly that the Appellants themselves refer to the
second dwelling unit as a casita – which by definition is “[a] small house or residence; esp. a
cabin or bungalow. Later also: a residential style of guest accommodation[.]” (Oxford
English Dictionary). Generally, a planning and zoning authority is granted broad regulatory
authority. “For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare, a ...
municipality ... may regulate and restrict within its jurisdiction the[ ]height, number of stories
and size of buildings and other structures[.]” Mechem v. City of Santa Fe, 1981-NMSC-104, ¶ 19, 96
N.M. 668, 671, 634 P.2d 690, 693. Nowhere do Appellants show how the Planning Administrator acted
outside the scope of her duties by applying the Village Zoning Code to their building permit
application. To the contrary, it was her duty to render a decision on their application which
complied with the Village Code and Comprehensive Plan to uniformly regulate the buildings
within the Village. Appellants’ mere disagreement with her decision does not make it ultra vires.
IV. CONCLUSION
In concluding, it is worth noting that Appellants are appealing the denial of something they said
they did not want—a separate dwelling unit. If indeed they did not want a separate dwelling unit,
their arguments then lead to the question of what they did want. If all they wanted was an
attached room that was not a dwelling unit, the Village approved that application. So at least two
alternatives are possible: Appellants indeed wanted a separate dwelling with a kitchen and other
15
aspects of a house, which the Village Zoning Code did not permit; and if they did not, their appeal
is moot because they now have what they were seeking via the permit issued on July 20, 2021.
For the reasons described above, it is clear—especially when considering undisputed facts with
deference to the agency and all reasonable inferences in support of the agency—that the
Governing Body’s decision in this matter is supported within the record by substantial evidence and
in accordance with the law. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the Governing Body’s ruling
in this matter.
V. STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
WHEREFORE, the Village of Corrales respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order dismissing
these proceedings with prejudice, affirming the Governing Body’s decision, and awarding
any other relief this Court deems just and proper.